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ABSTRACT 
Not only are Databases an integral and critical part of many information systems, they are critical information assets to many 
business enterprises. However, the network and host intrusion detection systems most enterprises use to detect attacks against 
their information systems cannot detect transaction-level attacks against databases. Transaction-level attacks often come from 
authorized users in the form of inference, query flood, or other anomalous query attacks. Insider attacks are not only growing 
in frequency, but remain significantly more damaging to businesses than external attacks. This paper proposes a database 
intrusion detection model to detect and respond to transaction-level attacks from authorized database users. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey (Richardson, 2008) reported continuing trends in the frequency and 
severity of insider abuse and financial fraud. From 2004 through 2011, respondents consistently reported insider abuse as the 
second most frequent type of security incident, trailing only behind malware (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Richardson, 
2004, 2005, 2006; Richardson, 2007, 2008, 2011). The specific rate of insider abuse incidents ranged from a low of 42% of 
all reported incidents (Gordon et al., 2006) to a high of 59% (Gordon et al., 2004; Richardson, 2007). Financial fraud is 
another form of insider attack, and accounted for 8% to 12% of reported incidents between 2004 and 2011 (Gordon et al., 
2004, 2005, 2006; Richardson, 2007, 2008, 2011). However, where the average rate of insider abuse has seen marked 
decreases in the past 10 years, from nearly 100% in 1999 to 42% in 2008, the average rate of financial fraud has remained 
relatively constant (Richardson, 2008). Not only are insider attacks frequent, they are also expensive. Financial fraud was 
reported as the single most expensive type of security incident, with average losses of almost $500,000 per respondent 
reporting such incidents (Richardson, 2008). Financial fraud has consistently been a source of high losses, being reported as 
the leading or second leading most expensive category of security incidents (Richardson, 2008). This is particularly 
noteworthy when compared to the rate of occurrence for malware incidents, which accounts for similar losses. Malware 
incidents are reported to occur at least five times more frequently than financial fraud, indicating the average loss per incident 
for financial fraud far exceeds that of any other computer security incident category (Richardson, 2008). The two insider 
related categories computer security incidents, insider abuse and financial fraud, account for a major portion of computer 
security losses (Richardson, 2007, 2008).  
Databases are a central component of most information systems today, and therefore represent critical assets to many 
organizations (Liu, 2002). However, securing databases from attacks presents unique challenges (Bertino, Kamra, Terzi, and 
Vakali, 2005; Chen & Chu, 2008; Kamra, Terzi, and Bertino, 2007; Squicciarini, Paloscia, and Bertino, 2008). Well 
recognized and accepted technical controls, such as firewalls, antivirus software, access control methods, and file permissions 
protect information systems at the network or operating system level, but do not protect against database specific attacks 
(Bertino, Jajodia, and Samarat, 1995; Chen and Chu, 2008; Kamra and Bertino, 2010; Kamra et al., 2007; Liu, 2002). 
Network and operating system defense mechanisms are largely designed to defend against external attackers (Kamra and 
Bertino, 2010), but insider attacks are the primary threat in transaction-level database attacks (Liu, 2002). Current database 
security research is focused on techniques to mitigate insider attacks (Bertino et al., 1995; Hu and Panda, 2003; Kamra et al., 
2007; Liu, 2002). Insider attacks against databases come in several forms. The most basic level is from authorized users who 
do not have database administrator rights (Hu and Panda, 2003; Kamra et al., 2007; Liu, 2002). These users have limited 
access to the database through a user account, but they do not have administrator privileges. The second category of insider 
threat is a group of authorized users who do not have database administrator rights, referred to as collaborators (Bertino, 
Leggieri, and Terzi, 2004; Chen and Chu, 2008). The individual members in the group do not have any more privileges than 
the single user noted in the first category, but because there are multiple users they can attack the database with greater 
stealth and potentially compromise more data than they could individually (Chen and Chu, 2008). A countermeasure 
designed to protect the database from an aggregation of malicious queries may not detect those same queries if they 
originated from collaborating users (Chen and Chu, 2008). The last insider category is database administrators (Kamra and 
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Bertino, 2010). Database administrators have the privileges to largely circumvent security controls designed to protect 
against authorized, but malicious users (Kamra and Bertino, 2010). Controls specifically designed to defend against 
privileged users, such as database administrators, are needed to counter this threat (Kamra and Bertino, 2010). This paper 
synthesizes current research on database intrusion detection and response, and proposes a database intrusion detection model 
that incorporates the key capabilities developed in earlier research. Database intrusion detection and response has been 
proposed as a defense against three categories of insider threats: standard users, collaborating standard users, and database 
administrators (Chen and Chu, 2008; Kamra and Bertino, 2010; Liu, 2002). Relevant studies are reviewed and limitations of 
those studies identified. The remainder of this paper provides a literature review, proposes a database intrusion detection 
module, indentifies areas for future research, and summarizes the paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Current database intrusion detection and response research can be grouped into two broad categories: architecture (Bertino et 
al., 2005; Kamra and Bertino, 2010; Liu, 2002) and type of attack (Bertino et al., 2005, 2004; Chen and Chu, 2008; Daswani 
and Garcia-Molina, 2002; Hu & Panda, 2003; Kamra et al., 2007; Squicciarini et al., 2008). Three types of attack are studied: 
inference attack (Kamra et al., 2007), anomalous query attack (Bertino et al., 2005; Hu and Panda, 2003; Kamra et al., 2007), 
and query flood attack (Bertino et al., 2004; Daswani and Garcia-Molina, 2002; Squicciarini et al., 2008). Prior research 
developed and tested database intrusion detection models (Bertino et al., 2005, 2004; Chen and Chu, 2008; Daswani and 
Garcia-Molina, 2002; Kamra and Bertino, 2010; Kamra et al., 2007; Squicciarini et al., 2008), while other research developed 
but did not test database intrusion detection systems (Hu and Panda, 2003; Liu, 2002). 
Architectures 
Five intrusion tolerant database architectures have been proposed (Liu, 2002). The core components of the proposed 
architectures consisted of the database management system and database themselves, a repair manager, and a database 
intrusion detection system (Liu, 2002). Additional components were added to the basic architecture to improve attack 
isolation and system resiliency, but each proposed architectural scheme retained the intrusion detector (Liu, 2002). Although 
the proposed architectures did not specify an intrusion detector, two functional requirements were noted (Liu, 2002). First, 
the intrusion detector must be capable of detecting attacks from multi-layers (Liu, 2002). Second, the intrusion detector must 
be capable of providing alarms or alerts (Liu, 2002). These database models (Liu, 2002) illustrate how to integrate an 
intrusion detection system into database systems to create intrusion tolerant database systems, but they do not specify what 
intrusion detection component to use.  
Later research extended the intrusion tolerant database architecture by examining a potential architecture for a database 
intrusion detection system (Bertino et al., 2004).  The new model recommended a three module intrusion detection system, 
including modules for training, comparison, and alarms (Bertino et al., 2004). The training module uses knowledge learning 
logic to develop profiles for each user role in the database system (Bertino et al., 2004). Role profiles are developed by 
analyzing the database log history to learn normal query patterns for each user profile (Bertino et al., 2004). As highlighted 
by the development of role profiles, the intrusion detection system is intended for database systems that employ role based 
access control (Bertino et al., 2004). This database intrusion detection system does not need to build, store, and maintain a 
profile for each individual user, but instead creates profiles for each user role (Bertino et al., 2004). This significantly reduces 
the knowledge learning workload, and makes the database intrusion detection system suitable for databases with many users 
(Bertino et al., 2004). This architecture could be used to detect multiple types of attacks, although the designers anticipated it 
would be used to counter anomalous queries (Bertino et al., 2004), and assumed anomalous query attacks would come from 
standard users (Bertino et al., 2004). As a result, the model proposed does not protect databases from malicious database 
administrators, or others malicious users who are able to gain administrator rights (Bertino et al., 2004; Kamra and Bertino, 
2010).  
A method to defend against tampering from database administrators strengthens the integrity of the database intrusion 
detection system (Kamra & Bertino, 2010). Tamper resistance can be achieved through an encryption-based system to sign 
the detection policies (Kamra & Bertino, 2010). The intrusion detection system validates the authenticity of the detection 
policies by verifying the attached signatures (Kamra & Bertino, 2010). The Joint Threshold Administration Model (JTAM) 
implements the concept of separation of duties using Shoup’s (Shoup, 2000) RSA threshold signature scheme (Kamra & 
Bertino, 2010). Three important deficiencies with threshold signatures have been noted (Shoup, 2000). First, previous 
threshold signature schemes lacked rigorous security proof (Shoup, 2000). Second, signature generation and verification 
required synchronous communications (Shoup, 2000). Not only are synchronous communications not necessary, they are 
undesirable for threshold signature schemes (Shoup, 2000). Third, the signature size increased linearly with the number of 
signers, resulting in potentially large signatures that were difficult to manage (Shoup, 2000). Shoup (2000) addressed these 
deficiencies with a new and relatively simple encryption algorithm. This new encryption scheme was utilized to have 
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multiple database administrators sign a policy, requiring collusion between database administrators to tamper with policies 
(Kamra and Bertino, 2010). 
Type of Attack 
The second category of database intrusion detection research examines the type of attack, and proposes solutions (Bertino et 
al., 2005, 2004; Chen and Chu, 2008; Daswani and Garcia-Molina, 2002; Hu and Panda, 2003; Kamra et al., 2007; 
Squicciarini et al., 2008). The remainder of this section discusses research on three types of database transaction-level 
specific attacks: inference attacks, query flood attacks, and anomalous query attacks. 
Inference Detection 
Farkas and Jajodia (Farkas and Jajodia, 2002) reviewed early work on inference detection systems by examining studies on 
three broad database categories: statistical databases, multilevel secure databases, and general purpose databases. Early 
developments in database inference detection systems used schema level knowledge to detect potential inference risks during 
system design (Delugach and Hinke, 1996; Garvey, Lunt, Quain, and Stickel, 1992). However, schema level detection is 
insufficient (Yip and Levitt, 1998).  
Five inference rules have been recommended for data level inference detection (Yip and Levitt, 1998). Although the list may 
not be comprehensive, the five proposed inference rules are: subsume inference rule, unique inference characteristics rule, 
overlapping inference rule, complementary inference rule, and functional dependency rule (Yip and Levitt, 1998). A 
prototype that implements the data level detection rules has been proposed (Chen and Chu, 2006). The prototype maintains a 
history of user requests and compares new requests to their history, with the goal of preventing users from accumulating 
enough data over multiple requests to infer data or knowledge they would otherwise be unauthorized to access (Chen and 
Chu, 2006). Requests that exceed a preset threshold are denied (Chen and Chu, 2006). The prototype also analyzes social 
relations to reduce inference risks from multiple collaborating users (Chen and Chu, 2006). Further development and 
subsequent testing of the prototype demonstrated its utility in mitigating inference attacks from both individual and 
collaborating users (Chen and Chu, 2008).  
The Semantic Inference Model (SIM) (Swami and Sawant, 2010) was proposed as a conceptual model of a data level 
inference detection system similar to that proposed by Chen & Chu (Chen and Chu, 2008). SIM examines data dependency, 
schema level data, and semantic relationships to create security policy. SIM offered an interesting approach for the use of 
semantic data (Swami and Sawant, 2010). SIM proposed using domain knowledge to counter data mining threats (Swami and 
Sawant, 2010). Domain knowledge relates semantic terms that otherwise would not be considered equal, but that relate to a 
common domain (Swami and Sawant, 2010). For example, although ‘window’ and ‘building’ are not equal, they are in the 
same domain. Because these terms are not equal, separate queries on these terms would not be evaluated to determine the risk 
of inference. However, the semantic knowledge component of SIM would evaluate these inputs in the same domain (Swami 
and Sawant, 2010). User inputs are retained in history, and each new user request is evaluated against their history and 
security policy (Swami and Sawant, 2010). Queries that exceed the threshold are denied (Swami and Sawant, 2010). SIM 
supported Chen and Chu’s (2008) method of detecting threat from collaborating users.  
Query Flood Detection 
A query flood attack is a database transaction level attack where a single malicious user or a group of collaborating malicious 
users send a large number of queries or updates to a database with the intent to deny access to other authorized users (Bertino 
et al., 2004; Squicciarini et al., 2008). Although the threat of query flood attacks had been postulated (Bertino et al., 2004; 
Daswani and Garcia-Molina, 2002), it had not been shown to be an effective way to disable or degrade a database until 
research empirically demonstrated query flood attacks can degrade the performance of both small and large databases 
(Squicciarini et al., 2008).  
An early study on query flood attacks examined the threat of a query flood attack in peer-to-peer networks, noting peer-to-
peer networks were particularly vulnerable to such attacks (Daswani and Garcia-Molina, 2002). Three types of 
countermeasures were recommended for query flood attacks in peer-to-peer networks: load balancing, proactive steps, and 
reactive steps (Daswani and Garcia-Molina, 2002). Peer-to-peer networks are inherently different from databases, and 
therefore the countermeasures proposed are not sufficient to protect databases (Squicciarini et al., 2008).  
The concept of query flood attacks was extended from peer-to-peer networks to databases (Bertino et al., 2004). Network 
defenses are not capable of protecting databases from query flood attacks because application level attacks do not necessarily 
involve malicious network traffic (Bertino et al., 2004). The first method proposed to counter database query flood attacks 
involved the use of database log information to learn patterns of normal behavior (Bertino et al., 2004). Granularity is an 
important feature of the training function (Bertino et al., 2004). The query flood detection system should be capable of 
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identifying attacks from misuse and anomalous queries (Bertino et al., 2004). These attacks have different query patterns, 
therefore the query flood detection system should be tunable to both forms of attack, and capable of responding to either 
(Bertino et al., 2004). Granularity is a second important characteristic of the query flood detection system (Bertino et al., 
2004). Two general approaches have been recommended, schismatic and catholic (Bertino et al., 2004). A schismatic 
approach allows the database administrator to independently evaluate relations between database tables, where the catholic 
approach considers the entire database as a whole (Bertino et al., 2004). Incoming queries are evaluated based solely on 
frequency of queries against the learned profiles of normal user behavior (Bertino et al., 2004).  
Three deficiencies have been noted with query flood detection based on learning user behavior patterns from logs 
(Squicciarini et al., 2008). First, the user behavior learning process requires profiles of normal user behavior, and therefore 
requires a large amount of logged data (Squicciarini et al., 2008). Second, an attack can only be detected after it has occurred 
(Squicciarini et al., 2008). Third, because the method is very articulated and not sufficiently tested, it is not clear how 
practical the method is in an operational environment (Squicciarini et al., 2008). Research on query flood attacks has been 
extended in several ways (Squicciarini et al., 2008). First, empirical evidence demonstrated for the first time that query flood 
attacks can severely degrade database performance (Squicciarini et al., 2008). Second, the ability of caching mechanisms to 
provide an inherent defense against query flood attacks was formally tested (Squicciarini et al., 2008). Third, an algorithm to 
evaluate queries and detect query flood attacks was developed (Squicciarini et al., 2008). The algorithm is derived from the 
theorem of the central limit and other experimental studies, but it was not tested (Squicciarini et al., 2008). Although the use 
of user logs was noted as a deficiency with early query flood detection methods (Squicciarini et al., 2008), more recent 
research has failed to resolve the deficiency. User logs are still used to learn patterns of normal user behavior (Squicciarini et 
al., 2008).   
A potential flaw exists in the extant research on query flood attacks. Denial of service attacks depend largely on asymmetry. 
Denial of service attacks try to achieve consuming more resources from the target than are consumed by the attacker, or by 
distributing the attacking resources across multiple attack sources. Asymmetry in query flood attacks could be achieved two 
ways: by frequency or complexity of queries. Extant research in query flood attacks only considers frequency (Bertino et al., 
2004; Daswani and Garcia-Molina, 2002; Squicciarini et al., 2008), and has not examined the possibility the same effects 
could be accomplished with low frequency but complex queries, such as queries with large join operations. Failing to 
consider this possibility could enable an attacker to circumvent a query flood detection system. 
Anomalous Detection 
Anomalous query attacks represent a broad set of unspecific transaction level database attacks (Bertino et al., 2005; Hu and 
Panda, 2003). Inference detection and query flood detection systems would be tuned to detect and respond to very specific 
types of attacks (Kamra and Bertino, 2010; Squicciarini et al., 2008). However, attacks against databases are not limited to 
these types of attacks, so a more general intrusion detection capability is necessary (Kamra et al., 2007).  Two approaches 
have been proposed: those for databases with role based access control (Bertino et al., 2004; Kamra et al., 2007), and those 
for databases without role based access control (Kamra et al., 2007).  
Role based access control not only greatly simplifies database administration, but it also greatly improves the efficiency of 
database intrusion detection by reducing the number of user profiles required (Bertino et al., 2004; Kamra et al., 2007). 
However, not all databases employ role based access control, and therefore a database intrusion detection capability that is 
not dependent on role based access control is required (Kamra et al., 2007).  
Intrusion detection in databases without role based access control presents significant challenges. Researchers have cautioned 
that even under normal conditions some users will have very few transactions, while other users will have frequent 
transactions (Kamra et al., 2007). Attempting to build profiles for individual users will create either excessively restrictive 
rules for frequent users, or excessively loose rules for infrequent users (Kamra et al., 2007). Grouping users with similar 
behavior patterns, and creating profiles for those “user groups” has been proposed as a solution (Kamra et al., 2007). User 
groups provide two advantages. First, they greatly reduce the number of profiles (Kamra et al., 2007). Second, they mitigate 
the potential problem of excessive false positives or false negatives (Kamra et al., 2007). Complementary approaches have 
been proposed (Hu and Panda, 2003; Kamra et al., 2007). One approach creates profiles based on user access patterns (Kamra 
et al., 2007), where another create profiles based on data dependency (Hu & Panda, 2003).  
An algorithm for user profiling and intrusion detection that consists of five components has been developed (Kamra et al., 
2007). Each transaction is characterized by these five components in what is referred to as a quiplet (Kamra et al., 2007). A 
quiplet consists of (a) the SQL command, (b) projection relation information, (c) projection attribute information, (d) 
selection relation information, and (e) selection attribute information (Kamra et al., 2007). The specific quiplet content will 
vary depending on the desired level of representation. Three levels of detail were proposed, coarse, medium, and fine (Kamra 
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et al., 2007). Initially, anomalous free log data is processed through a classifier used to develop user profiles. The classifier 
uses a Naïve Bayes Classifier (NBC) for learning and detection (Kamra et al., 2007). NBC was chosen because of low 
computational requirements and previously demonstrated applicability for this type of function (Kamra et al., 2007). 
Algorithm accuracy was assessed against test data. The algorithm achieved reasonably satisfactory results (Kamra et al., 
2007). 
DATABASE INTRUSION DETECTION MODEL 
 
Figure 1. Database intrusion detection model 
The proposed database intrusion detection model (DIDM) in Figure 1 includes four modules: (a) a learning module (Bertino 
et al., 2005), (b) an intrusion detection module (Liu, 2002), (c) an alert module (Liu, 2002), and (d) a policy management 
module (Kamra & Bertino, 2010). DIDM expands earlier work (Bertino et al., 2005; Kamra & Bertino, 2010) by including 
specific modules for the three key transaction-level database attacks, as well as a security policy management module.  
The learning module uses an NBC to learn user behavior patterns based on historical log data (Bertino et al., 2005; Kamra et 
al., 2007) to create profiles of normal user behavior. Users could be individual users, user groups, or user roles depending on 
the database. The intrusion detection module has sub-modules to detect inference, query flood, and anomalous query attacks. 
The inference detection sub-module is based on SIM. SIM is the most developed inference detection model reviewed, but did 
not include the capability to detect inference attacks from collaborating users. Therefore, a capability to detect attacks from 
collaborating users will be included (Chen and Chu, 2006, 2008). The query flood and anomalous query attack modules will 
also be based on earlier research (Kamra et al., 2007; Squicciarini et al., 2008). Each sub-module compares current user 
activity against the user profile. The intrusion detection module reports user activities that are anomalous to normal user 
behavior to the alarm and response module. The alarm and response module compares reported activities to security policy 
and responds with alerts according to security policy. The security management module updates security policies. JTAM 
(Kamra and Bertino, 2010), an RSA threshold signature scheme (Shoup, 2000), is employed to ensure security policies are 
not tampered with by users or administrators. 
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AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
DIDM is conceptual and has not been tested. Future research could examine the efficiency and effectiveness of DIDM, as 
well as the tradeoffs between efficiency and effectiveness. Much of the extant research on database intrusion detection 
examines either efficiency or effectiveness, either of which can be achieved at the expense of the other (Bertino et al., 2005). 
Future research should evaluate an optimal balance between accuracy and efficiency for different intrusion detection 
capabilities.  
Database intrusion detection systems are not intended to meet an information system’s full security requirements, or intrusion 
detection capabilities (Bertino et al., 2005; Kamra et al., 2007; Squicciarini et al., 2008), so a critical information system with 
a database should have not only a database intrusion detection system, but also network and host intrusion detection systems. 
Individual intrusion detection systems can create extensive amounts of information and audit log data. Administrators could 
be overwhelmed with the data generated by multiple intrusion detection systems. Future research might examine how to best 
integrate these various intrusion detection capabilities into an overall enterprise log management system. 
Extant research on query flood attacks focuses on the frequency of queries. However, it’s possible a low volume of queries 
that require extensive system resources could degrade or disable a database for legitimate users. Future research could 
examine how query complexity could be used in a database denial of service attack, and integrate that concept into query 
flood attack detection and response.  
CONCLUSION 
The research discussed in this paper states the need for database specific intrusion detection and response systems. Network 
and host intrusion detection systems are not capable of analyzing transaction level data, and therefore are not capable of 
detecting or responding to transaction level attacks (Bertino et al., 2005; Chen and Chu, 2006, 2008). Current database 
intrusion detection and response research does not provide complete and comprehensive systems, but does lay the foundation 
for such systems. 
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